GOD

    

 

GOD'S EXISTENCE

Here is the conception of classical philosophical theology: of Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and other such thinkers.

God is not an object or substance alongside other objects or substances in the world; rather, He is pure being or existence itself, utterly distinct from the world of time, space, and things, underlying and maintaining them in being at every moment, and apart from whose ongoing conserving action they would be instantly annihilated. The world is not an independent object in the sense of something that might carry on if God were to “go away”; it is more like the music produced by a musician, which exists only when he plays and vanishes the moment he stops. None of the concepts we apply to things in the world, including to ourselves, apply to God in anything but an analogous sense. Hence, for example, we may say that God is “personal” insofar as He is not less than a person, the way an animal is less than a person. But God is not literally “a person” in the sense of being one individual thing among others who reasons, chooses, has moral obligations, etc. such concepts make no sense when literally applied to God.

Aquinas’s famous doctrine of analogy, on which the language we use to refer to God is not used in the same or “univocal” sense in which it is applied to things in this world (as might describe a fire engine and Stop sign as being “red” in exactly the same sense), but neither is it used in a completely different or “equivocal” sense (the way that a tree has “bark” and a dog has a “bark” in entirely different senses,). Rather, it is used in an analogical sense, as when you say hat you “see” the tree in front of you and also that  you can “see” that the Pythagorean theorem must be true. Obviously you don’t see the truth of the theorem in exactly the same sense in which you see a tree, but there is an analogy between vision and intellectual insight that makes the use of the term appropriate in both cases. Similarly, God is not personal, or good, or powerful, or intelligent in the same sense in which a human being is, but He can nevertheless  correctly be described in these terms if they are understood analogously.

We can know which terms apply by examining the arguments for God’s existence and their implications.

Intro to Metaphysics Part V

  

 

 

Nature of Metaphysical  Arguments.

Now Aquinas’s arguments, like Plato’s and Aristotle’s, are metaphysical in character, not scientific; that does not mean that they are not rational arguments. They are different in the following respects.

They are like geometrical arguments in being all-or-nothing but unlike geometrical arguments they start with empirical premises rather than pure abstractions.

Scientific arguments start from empirical premises and draw merely probabilistic conclusions.

Mathematical arguments start from purely conceptual premises and draw necessary conclusions.

Metaphysical arguments combine elements of both these other forms of reasoning: they take obvious, though empirical, starting points, and try to show that from these starting points, together with certain conceptual premises, certain metaphysical conclusions follow necessarily. Using empirical starting points that cannot seriously be doubted. Ex.: More than one object is red.

Plato and Aristotle argued that given the nature of things as we observe them, there must necessarily be forms or universals that are neither purely mental nor reducible to matter.

As with geometrical arguments, metaphysical reasoning is not infallible.

Ex.: Parmenides would claim to doubt that change ever occurs. This sort of doubt derives from a competing metaphysical theory, rather than from scientific discovery.

The New Atheists’ criticism do not see the difference between a scientific hypothesis and a metaphysical demonstration; they thereby rule out metaphysical arguments, (scientism or positivism).

They have to defend their position not just assert it. The moment thy attempt to defend it, they will have effectively refuted it, for scientism or positivism is itself a metaphysical position that could only be justified using metaphysical arguments.

Assumptions scientific investigation takes for granted:

_There is a physical world existing independently from our minds.

_This world has objective patterns and regularities.

_Our senses are at least partially reliable sources of information about this world.

_There are objective laws of logic and mathematics that apply to this world.

_Our cognitive powers (concept formation, reasoning)  afford us a grasp of these laws.

_The language we use can adequately express truths about these laws and about the external world; and so on and on.

Science, since its very method presupposes these assumptions, could not possibly defend them without arguing in a circle.

Their defense is a task for metaphysics, and for philosophy more generally; scientism is shown thereby to be incoherent.

The New Atheists (Dawkins in particular) try to frame the debate about the existence of God and the nature of the human mind as if they hinged on evolution. This is an attempt to very bad metaphysics indeed.

Aquinas does not argue that “everything has a cause”, nor does he argue that the universe had a beginning and that God was the cause of that beginning.

His aim is to show that given that there are in fact some causes of various sorts, the nature of cause and effect entails that God is necessary as an uncaused cause of the universe even if the universe had no beginning.

 

Intelligent Design of Sleep

Eric Hedin on the Intelligent Design of Sleep

Eric Hedin on the Intelligent Design of Sleep | ID the Future

 

Eric Hedin

 We’re asleep an average of about 26 years of our life! Most people have a sense that sleep is important, but many of us aren’t sure exactly why. Why is sleep so crucial to survival? And how did the processes of sleep emerge in living things? Could a gradual Darwinian process be responsible, or are the systems involved another instance of intelligent design? On this episode, host Andrew McDiarmid begins a conversation with Dr. Eric Hedin about the origin and intelligent design of sleep.

In Part 1, Dr. Hedin suggests that the evolutionary mindset operates as a major obstacle to the scientific understanding of sleep. From an evolutionary point of view, sleep is risky for the fitness of organisms. “Survival of the unconscious…the most unconscious person wins…that just doesn’t seem to fit at all with an evolutionary survival of the fittest paradigm,” says Hedin. In his review of the science literature on sleep, Hedin found that even Darwinist researchers admit that there has to be a really good reason for sleep for it to have been selected through an evolutionary process.

Dr. Hedin also unpacks what’s going on when we sleep. Though it’s simple to fall asleep and wake up, there’s a complicated set of processes involved that exhibit complex engineering design patterns and irreducible complexity, both key hallmarks of intelligently designed systems.

This is Part 1 of a two-part interview. Look for Part 2 next!

Dig Deeper

Read the articles by Dr. Hedin that inspired this interview:

Sleep: Designed For Our Good

https://evolutionnews.org/2023/12/sleep-designed-for-our-good/

Sleeping and Waking: A Designer’s Gift

https://evolutionnews.org/2023/12/sleeping-and-waking-a-designers-gift/

Eric Hedin

FELLOW, CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND CULTURE

Eric Hedin earned his doctorate in physics from the University of Washington and conducted post-doctoral research at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden in experimental plasma physics. He has taught physics and astronomy at Taylor University and Ball State University (BSU) in Indiana, and at Biola University in Southern California. He served as professor of physics at Biola University in California, and chaired the department of chemistry, physics, and engineering at Biola from 2019-2021. Since the fall of 2021, Dr. Hedin has taught physics part-time with Indiana Wesleyan University and speaks regularly at universities around the country with God’s Not Dead Events, led by Dr. Rice Broocks. Dr. Hedin is also an emeritus professor of physics and astronomy at Ball State University in Indiana.

Intro to Metaphysics Part IV

 

    

Part 4

The Four Causes:

These might be the most important of all the philosophical concepts we’ve looked at so far.

Material cause > the underlying stuff a thing is made of.

Formal cause  > which is the form, structure, or the pattern that the form exhibits.

As you can see, the material and formal causes of a thing are just its matter and form, considered as components of a complete explanation of it.

Efficient cause > which is what brings a thing into being, or more generally and technically, which actualizes a potentiality in a thing.

Final cause  > which is the end, goal, or purpose of a thing.

The four causes are completely general, applying throughout the natural world and not only to human artifacts.

Ex.:

A heart’s material cause> muscle tissue of a certain sort.

       “        formal cause > muscle tissue organized into atria, ventricles and the like.

       “        efficient cause> biological processes that determined that certain embryonic cells would form into a heart rather than, say, a kidney or brain.

“      final cause > it serves the function of pumping blood.

Remember that Aristotle’s entire metaphysical scheme is “moderate realism”.

A thing’s formal cause is, at the deepest level, its substantial form or essence; its material cause entails that it has certain potentialities and lacks others; its formal cause, being its substantial form or essence, is shared by other things and known by the intellect via abstraction from experience; and so forth. To be sure, these various philosophical subtleties are built on common sense and do not contradict it, but they do go considerably beyond it.

Just as material and formal causation are deeply intertwined on Aristotle’s account, so too are efficient causes and final causes. You simply cannot properly understand the one apart from the other; indeed, there cannot be efficient causes without final ones.

Modern thinkers deny that there really are any final causes at all, appearances notwithstanding. This has led them into all sorts of paradoxes and incoherencies.

Modern tendency is to treat cause and effect as essentially a relation between temporally ordered events; the first event causes the second one. Maybe “cause and effect” is just a matter of there being regular or “lawlike” correlations between events, and science must rest content with discovering these correlations.

The way of posing the “problem” of cause and effect just described owes much to the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), a big hero to “New Atheists” and secularists in general.

Supposed you asked somebody what caused the broken window. He probably say, “The brick did”—the brick, not “the event of the brick’s being thrown”. In other words, for common sense it is ultimately things that are causes, not events. Aristotle would agree. He would also say that the immediate efficient cause of an effect, and the one most directly responsible for it, is simultaneous with the effect, not temporally prior to it.

It may be noticed that Aristotle’s account seems to entail a series of simultaneous causes and effects, and might also wonder where such a series terminates and how it can be explained.

Also relevant is a further Aristotelian principle concerning efficient causation, namely that whatever is in the effect must in some sense be contained in the cause as well.

Cause cannot give to its effect what it does not have to give.

The effect might be contained in the cause in various ways.

The cause of a fire might itself be on fire, as when a torch is used to start a brushfire, or it may instead have the power to produce fire, as a cigarette lighter has even when it is not being used.

The traditional way of making this distinction is to say that a cause has the feature that it generates in the effect “formally” in the first sort of case and “eminently” in the second sort of case.

If a cause didn’t contain all the features of its effect either formally or eminently, there would be no way to account for how the effect came about in just the way it did.

Again a cause cannot give to its effect what it does not have.

There will be more to say about the dramatic implications of Aristotle’s conception of efficient causes later.

Aristotle regards final causation—goal-directedness, purposiveness, something’s pointing toward an end beyond itself—as extending well beyond the realm of human artifacts, indeed as pervading the natural world.

Aristotle takes final causation or goal-directedness to exist throughout inorganic nature as well. The moon is “directed toward” movement around the earth, as a kind of ‘goal.” Fire is directed toward the production of heat, specifically, rather than cold.

He is not making the claim that the moon is consciously trying to go around the sun. or that fire wants to produce heat.

His whole point, in fact, is that there is a kind of goal-directness that exists even apart from conscious thought processes and intentions.

For Aristotle, our conscious thought processes are really but a special case of the more general natural phenomenon of goal-directedness or final causality, which exists in the natural world in a way that is mostly totally divorced from any conscious mind or intelligence. The functions of various bodily organs (hearts, kidneys, livers, etc.) are the most obvious examples—the organs have these functions, and performs them, even though they are totally unconscious—but less complex forms of final causality are to be found throughout the inorganic realm.

Aquinas refers to the final cause as “the cause of causes,” and for good reason.

The material cause o a thing underlies its potential for change; but potentialities, as we’ve seen, are always potentialities for, or directed toward, some actuality. Hence final causality underlies all potentiality and thus all materiality. The final cause of a thing is also the central aspect of its formal cause; indeed, it determines its formal cause. For it is only because a thing has a certain end of final cause that it has the form it has—hence hearts have ventricles, atria, and the like precisely because they have the function of pumping blood. 

Also, again, efficient causality cannot be made sense of apart from final causality.

Indeed, nothing makes sense—not the world as a whole, not morality or human action in general, not the thoughts you’re thinking or the words you’re using, not anything at all—without final causes. They are certainly utterly central to, and ineliminable from, our conception of ourselves as rational and freely choosing agents, whose thoughts and actions are always directed toward an end beyond themselves.

Yet modern philosophers, scientists, and intellectuals in general claim not to believe in final causality. I say “claim” because, like all normal human beings, they actually appeal to final causes all the time in their everyday personal lives, and even to a great extent in their professional lives.

Aristotle’s account of the metaphysical structure of reality, far from being empty verbiage or of mere academic interest, has dramatic implications for religion, morality, and science that will repay the effort we have put into understanding it.

     

HOW REASONABLE IS SCIENTIFIC REASON?

 

 

The following is part of an interview from cbc radio. The interviewee is Sajay Samuel .

Isn’t scientific knowledge true since it manifestly works? Samuel begins his answer by drawing a distinction he finds in the work of historian of science Peter Dear.

Samuel Sajay: Peter Dear notes that, when we today speak about science, we speak about science in two ways. We refer to bodies of knowledge that tell us something about the world as it is. We also speak about science as an instrument with which to change the world, to improve the world—the vaccine, the bomb, the car.

It has both this instrumental face, to use his language, and a natural, philosophical face—natural philosophy being the study of the way the world works and the way the world is. When you ask, why is science true? Why is a certain theory true?, the tendency is to say, because it works, because the plane flies, because the vaccine prevents disease, because the atom bomb explodes—those stand as proofs of the truth claims of science. If science were false, if the truth claims made by science were false, this vaccine wouldn’t work. If you ask, why does this vaccine work; it’s because the science is true. There’s circularity in this jusࢢficaࢢon; it’s true because it works, and it works because it’s true. Peter Dear calls it an ideology, and he calls it that in part, I think, because it can be falsified. Take the case of radio waves, which is one of his two examples. The predicࢢon of radio waves in 1880, I think it was, by Hertz, based upon a scienࢢfic theory propounded by Maxwell regarding the ether. The atmosphere is composed of ether through which radio waves propagate. Well the radio waves, which is one of his two examples. Well the radio waves were real—the prediction was sound; it worked—but the theory was not: it was utterly false. The other example he gives is of navigators, who, even today, use the old geocentric astronomy rather than the heliocentric astronomy. Again, you can have a perfectly false theory regarding what the world is, and it’s useful. You can get things done. This unquestioned justification—why is something true? Because it works. Why does it work? Because it’s true— can be easily falsified. And yet is held. We don’t tend to question the connection between knowing something and constructivism, knowledge through construction can be understood to be the signature of modernity.

What concerns Samuel is that science, historically speaking, doesn’t just supplement common sense; it displaces it. Scientific knowing becomes the epitome of reason and the paradigm of all proper knowledge. The term “common sense” continues to denote sound judgment, but it also begins to evoke a certain ignorance of how things really are. Typical, in this respect, is Albert Einstein’s often cited remark that “common sense is nothing more than a deposit of prejudice laid down by the mind in childhood.”

Samuel wants to contest science’s monopoly of reason. He would like to restore the dignity of common sense and restrict the application of science. Two distinctions are crucial to his case: mathematical knowledge must be distinguished from judgment, and experiment must be distinguished from experience.

Benedict XVI on Faith and Reason

 Ratzinger was concerned with the faith-reason relation.

In (Intro to Christianity p.26) he wrote: “Ever since the Prologue to the Gospel of John, the concept of logos has been at the very center of Christian faith . . . The God who is logos guarantees the intelligibility of the world, the intelligibility of our existence, the aptitude of reason to know God and the reasonableness of God, even though his understanding infinitely surpasses ours and to us may so often appear to be darkness. 

“The world comes from reason, and this reason is a Person, is Love.” Ibid.

In ITC Ratzinger is dealing with a text governed by the word credo and can hardly avoid giving some account of the act of faith.

He begins with the assertion that for human living, openness to a reality that exceeds the visible and tangible is an existential prerequisite, even an imperative. p.52

Until the early modern period, rational thought assisted, rather than inhibited, the act of faith in the invisible.

For ancient and medieval ontology, being is true—intelligible, meaningful—because it is creatively thought by God, who is absolute spirit. So long as this presupposition is in place, we can describe human thinking as the “rethinking of being” or the “rethinking of the thought that is being itself.” Man can rethink the logos, the meaning of being, because his own logos, his reason, is logos of the one logos, thought of the original thought, of the creative spirit that permeates and governs his being. Ibid p.59

This (healthful)assumption was abandoned, highly influentially, by the eighteenth-century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico.

According to Vico, understanding is or should be of the humanly initiated.

Not verum quia ens,”true because being,” but verum quia factum, “true because made”. 

Eventually it produces the technological rationality which Ratzinger takes to be normative today. The true is now the feasible.

Here we have a further definition of truth, verum quia faciendum: something is “true because it can be done.” 

In the context of the ancient thinking and of the Bible, a stand was taken trustfully on the ground of the word of God. op.cit.p69

That word is meant to clear a path to the total of reality.

Such a total meaning cannot be made, it can only be received. 

This enables Benedict to make a link with the New Testament concept of faith. 

Christian faith is a faith that comes “from hearing”. Romans 10:17

To put it in another way, such a faith is the reception of something that I have not thought out, so that in the last analysis thinking in the context of faith is always a thinking over of something previously heard and received.op.cit.p.91

The affirmation of “credo in” ends not with a ground but with a person: the incarnate Word, in whose life “the meaning of the world is present before us”.

So that beside the language of logos is the language of love.

“Meaning knows me and loves me.” Ibid p.80

The self-communicative fullness of being(a philosophical description) is identical with the self-donation of the God of love. Absolute being, unsurpassable love.

Theology must continue to draw from the treasury of knowledge that it did not invent itself, that always surpasses it and that, never being totally exhaustible through reflection, and precisely because of this launches thinking.

Philosophy must truly remain an undertaking of reason in its proper freedom and proper responsibility; it must recognize its limits, and precisely in this way also its grandeur and vastness.

Intro to Metaphysics Part 3

 

                                      

                            

                                Plato and his student Aristotle.

                                                   

                                           Part 3

                                 Actuality and Potentiality

(I think that I may have forgotten to mention that I have been and will continue to rely heavily on the American philosopher Edward C. Feser.)

For Aristotle as for Plato, universals or forms are real, and they are not reducible to anything either material or mental. Still, he thinks it is an error to regard them as objects existing in a “third realm” of their own. Rather, considered as they are in themselves they exist only “in” the things they are the forms of; and considered as abstractions from these things, they exist only in the intellect. Furthermore even the intellect rely on the senses in coming to know them.

A. Actuality and potentiality

Contra Parmenides who said that change is impossible because something can’t come from nothing, but that nothing was the only thing that something new could come from, since the only thing there is other than what already exists (i.e. being) is non-being or nothing.

Aristotle’s reply is that while it is true that something can’t come from nothing, it is false to suppose that nothing or non-being is the only possible candidate for a source of change.

Take a blue rubber ball for instance.

It can be solid, round, blue, and bouncy. (Different aspects of its being)

There are ways it is not: square and red, for example; it is not a dog or other things.

But the ball is potentially is: red (if you paint it), soft and gooey (if you melt it), a miniature globe (if you draw little continents on it), and so forth.

So being and non-being aren’t the only relevant factors here; there are also a thing’s various potentialities.