The following from a Gilson Reader illustrates quite well I
think the point I was trying to make to my brother which is: “ a philosophy or philosopher
can only be understood in the context of the history of philosophy.”
How can the
domain of pure thought ever be in touch with the domain of pure extension when
the property of substances is to be mutually exclusive? This is what Descartes
does not tell us. He allows us a thought (not a soul), and extension (not a
body): he is unable to account for the union of soul and body.
. . . The
occasionalism of Malebranche, the pre-established harmony of Leibniz, the
parallelism of Spinoza are so many
metaphysical “epicycles to solve an ill-stated problem by rescuing, with the
aid of complementary devices, the very principle which make the problem
insoluble.
Again:
What is the
most striking difference between the Greek notion of the deity and the notion
of God common to practically all the seventeenth-century philosophers? The best
answer we can imagine is that, apart from Anaximander, who in a rather cryptic
statement said that “the first principle of all things is infinite,” no known
Greek philosopher ever posited an infinite being as the cause of all that which
is, whereas Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, and practically all the other
metaphysicians of the seventeenth century conceived of God as the primary cause
of all that which is, and they did so on the strength of he principle hat, if
there is a God, He must needs be an infinite being. The remark applies even to
the only one among these philosophers who was not a Christian, namely Spinoza. God, Spinoza says, ”is a being absolutely indefinite, that is a
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal
and infinite essence.” What can be the cause for this radical change in
perspective? The only answer we can imagine is that this cause is to be found
in the theological speculation which starting from the biblical notion of a
Creator of all
beings, led the men of the middle ages to conceive infinity as a positive conception of being.
Again:
. . . Even Spinoza cannot be fully accounted for
without taking into account the speculation of the middle ages. To overlook
what happened to philosophy in the thirteenth century is to deprive the history
of Wetsern thought of its continuity and, by the same token, its
intelligibility.